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Répétition  d’un  Ballet, the famous painting by French artist Edgar Degas, sold 
for $401,000 in 1965.  The jubilant seller bragged that Degas originally asked a 
mere $100 for the painting.1  In his early career, celebrated American artist Norman 
Rockwell sold original works like Homecoming Marine and Breaking Home Ties 
for a few hundred dollars each.2  In the last decade, these paintings were resold for 
$9.2   million   and   $15.4   million   at   Sotheby’s   auctions,   but   the   Rockwell   estate  
received nothing in these transactions.3  Over the centuries, great wealth in the arts 
has rarely translated into great wealth for the artist.4  Since its inception in France, 
the resale royalty known as the droit de suite has aimed at remedying this perceived 
injustice.5 
Although a resale royalty right is currently recognized in seventy-nine 
 
 * Columbia Law School, J.D., 2014; University of California, Berkeley, B.A., 2010.  Thank 
you to Laura O’Neill, Grant Goeckner-Zoeller and Abigail Everdell for their unyielding support 
throughout the publication process.  Thank you to Ashley Kita for sharing her love for all forms of art 
and inspiring me to write this piece.  
 1. Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act:  A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed 
Enactment for the United States, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 23–24 (1967). 
 2. See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y ILLUSTRATORS P’SHIP (“ASIP”), COMMENTS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE 
TO U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE’S SEPT. 19, 2012 NOTICE OF INQUIRY 4–5 (2012). 
 3. See id. 
 4. This problem has long been recognized by visual artists: 
The folklore of the art world is replete with tales of wealth and poverty, of fortunes made in the 
gamble of art collecting, and of artists, whose paintings now bring vast sums, dying, cold and 
hungry in a Paris garret, or whose heirs, like la pauvre fille of Millet, sold flowers on the streets 
to subsist. 
Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite:  The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged Artist 
under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 1 (1962) (internal citation omitted).  While 
Norman Rockwell and his heirs accumulated great wealth through copyright ownership and the 
exploitation of reproductions of his works, Rockwell’s story serves as the exception to the rule that 
visual artists primarily benefit through the sale of their original works, and not through reproductions 
and reprints.  See Elliott Morss, Norman Rockwell Made A Fortune, But He Could Have Made More, 
GLOBAL ECON. INTERSECTION (Mar. 29, 2014), available at http://econintersect.com/a/blogs/blog1.php/ 
norman-rockwell-made-a-fortune. 
 5. See, e.g., 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8C.04[A][1] 
(2012). 
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jurisdictions, California is the only American jurisdiction to have adopted it.6  The 
California Resale Royalties Act (CRRA), enacted in 1976, grants visual artists the 
right to collect a 5% royalty on the total sales price each time their works are resold 
in California or by a resident of California.7  The fate of the California Resale 
Royalty Act, however, currently rests with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.8 
Unfortunately for the artists who have sued   eBay,  Sotheby’s   and  Christie’s   to  
collect royalties under the law, the California Resale Royalty Act violates the U.S. 
Constitution.9 The CRRA requires a 5% royalty to be withheld from the sales price 
for the artist of any work of art that is sold by a California resident, irrespective of 
where that sale takes place.10  Granting  the  auction  houses’  motion  to  dismiss,  the  
District Court for the Central District of California ruled that the law exceeds the 
constitutional   limitations   on   a   state’s   ability   to   regulate transactions occurring 
outside its borders.11  The  California  legislature  recognized  that  “were  the  CRRA  to  
apply only to sales occurring in California, the art market would surely have fled 
the  state  to  avoid  paying  the  5%  royalty.”12  Yet this extraterritorial feature of the 
CRRA has led to its undoing.  State laws that reach beyond their borders to regulate 
sales   in   other   states   are   subject   to   scrutiny   under   the   Supreme   Court’s   dormant  
commerce clause jurisprudence.13  As the California governor and legislature were 
warned   before   signing   the   bill   into   law,   the   CRRA’s   extraterritorial   reach   is   an  
affront to the U.S. Constitution.14 
On the other hand, all hope is not lost for an American droit de suite.  Perhaps 
recognizing the futility of state-level legislation, the Copyright Office recently 
retreated from its prior disapproval of federal droit de suite legislation.15  The 
Copyright   Office   now   “believe[s]   that   Congress   may   want   to   consider   a   resale  
royalty,”   and   has   issued   a   comprehensive   report   with   a   succinct   list   of   practical  
 
 6. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES:  AN UPDATED ANALYSIS, app. E (2013), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf (hereinafter “2013 
Report”). 
 7. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2014). 
 8. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 
12-56077 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012).  For a discussion of the practice of commenting on forthcoming 
rulings, see William J. Ledbetter, Propriety of Law Review Comment on Pending Cases, 7 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 35 (1950); With the Editors, 84 HARV. L. REV. vii, vii (1970) (“Instead of avoiding currently 
open questions, we believe it is in these uncharted areas especially that we should seek to find legal 
guideposts.”). 
 9. See Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. 
 10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a).  The statute also imposes the royalty on any sale that takes 
place in California, regardless of the seller’s residency.  Id. 
 11. Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE:  THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY (1992), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/droit_de_suite.pdf (hereinafter “1992 Report”); Shira 
Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists:  An Analysis of the Register of Copyrights’ Report, 16 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 395 (1992). 
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recommendations for effective implementation and enforcement.16  Although 
artists may have lost   the   battle   with   the   CRRA,   the   Copyright   Office’s   report  
indicates that they may yet be able to win the war for a resale royalty. 
I.    “WHEN  HIS  BOOK[ART] IS POPULAR, HE IS  ENRICHED”—THE 
DROIT DE SUITE REMEDIES  COPYRIGHT’S INFERIOR TREATMENT 
OF VISUAL ARTISTS 
A resale royalty has long been supported as a measure to place visual artists 
(including painters, illustrators, sculptors and photographers) on equal footing with 
other creative authors, who have traditionally enjoyed more complete protection 
under copyright law.17  The U.S. Copyright Office recognizes that visual artists—
unlike authors, composers and performers, who exploit their work primarily 
through reproduction—receive compensation primarily for the initial sale of their 
original works.18  Without a resale royalty, visual artists have no access to the 
secondary market where their original works of art are resold, often at prices 
astronomically higher than the original purchase price.19 
Unlike other creative products, works of visual art often derive their value from 
the   original   physical   embodiment   of   the   artists’   efforts.20  The unique object 
created by an artist—which is treated as a tangible chattel—is considered valuable 
simply because nothing else is quite like an original.  Sculptors, for example, create 
value only in the original works they produce; they are largely unable to profit from 
mass reproductions or the distribution of copies.21  Without a resale royalty, the 
only opportunity to exploit a work of visual art is upon its initial sale. 
The value  of  a  writer’s  manuscript  or  a  composer’s  sheet  music  does  not  lie  in  
the original physical creation, but rather in the ability to recreate and perform the 
ideas embodied by the physical work.22  As a result, the vast majority of 
copyrightable works are commercially exploited through mass reproduction.23 
Copyright   law   incentivizes   authors   such   that   “when   his   book   is   popular,   he   is  
enriched.”24  Without the droit de suite, visual artists have no way to directly 
 
 16. 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 3 (Cover Letter from Maria A. Pallante to The Honorable 
Jerrold Nadler). 
 17. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8C.04[A][1]. 
 18. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 400 (“Unlike other works, their value lies in the uniqueness of 
the original physical embodiment, the painting or sculpture itself.”); see also 2013 Report, supra note 6, 
at 1 n.2. 
 19. See, e.g., Carol Vogel, “The Scream” Is Auctioned for a Record $119.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/arts/design/the-scream-sells-for-nearly-120-million 
-at-sothebys-auction.html. 
 20. See Hauser, supra note 4, at 15–16. 
 21. Cf. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 40:  COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR PICTORIAL, 
GRAPHIC, AND SCULPTURAL WORKS 2 (2013), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ40.pdf 
(“Copyright does not protect the mechanical or utilitarian aspects of such works of craftsmanship.”). 
 22. Id. at 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists:  The Case of the 
Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1343 (1968) (“The copyright statute permits the author to reap 
continuing benefits from the sale of his books so that his prosperity rides with the times:  when his book 
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exploit the increasing popularity of a work.  The goal of the resale royalty is to give 
visual artists a lasting economic interest in their works. 
Proponents of the droit de suite argue that recognizing such a right would 
encourage the creation of more works of art.25  Incentivizing innovation is the 
constitutional justification for copyright law in the United States,26 the basic idea 
being that “increased   remuneration   for   the   creator   leads   to   more   creation.”27  A 
resale royalty would not only ensure artists greater compensation for the works 
they create, but would also incentivize artists to improve their overall reputations, 
which would indirectly increase the value of their royalty interest in prior works.  It 
has   also   been   suggested   that   a   “post mortem resale   royalt[y]”   would   encourage  
living artists to create art to support their heirs after their death.28 
The doctrine of reciprocity is another major benefit of droit de suite legislation.  
Article 14ter of the Berne Convention requires a country to recognize the royalty 
right of an artist from a foreign country only when mutuality exists, that is, when 
both nations recognize the droit de suite.29  As a result, American artists are unable 
to claim relevant royalties when their art is sold in many foreign jurisdictions.  
American artists selling works in Australia, for instance, have relinquished 
royalties on approximately $2.7 million in sales (10.4% of all sales by foreign 
artists in Australia) because the United  States’  failure  to  satisfy  mutuality.30 
II.  THE CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTY ACT CANNOT STAND 
In the late 1960s, academics published a number of prominent law review 
articles on the subject of the droit de suite and its popularity in Europe.31  Around 
 
is popular, he is enriched; when sales lag, he can wait.  A painter or sculptor, it is commonly thought, 
has no such luxury.”). 
 25. See Maryam Dilmaghani, Visual Artists’ Resale Royalty:  An Application of the Principal and 
Agent Model, 5 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 37, 39 (2008); Sam Ricketson, Moral Rights and 
the Droit de Suite:  International Conditions and Australian Obligations, 3 ENT. L. REV. 78, 85–86 
(1990). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
 27. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 406; see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 
(1994) (citing Twentieth Cent. Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 28. 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 37. 
 29. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 14ter, § 1, Sept. 9, 
1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.  The Berne Convention is an international agreement 
aimed at equalizing the treatment of copyrighted works among its signatories.  Although the United 
States initially declined to become a party to the Convention, the Senate ratified the treaty by enacting 
the U.S. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see also 1 SAM 
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE 
BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006). 
 30. See COPYRIGHT AGENCY & VISCOPY, SUBMISSION TO US COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON ARTISTS’ 
RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT 5 (2012), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/comments/ 
77fr58175/Copyright_Agency_Viscopy.pdf (“Our research shows that between 2007 and 2011, works 
by a total of 47 American artists have generated sales of USD 2,606,343 at Australian auctions.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Price, supra note 24; Schulder, supra note 1; see also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, 
supra note 2929.  As is often the case with new developments in the art world, the genesis of the resale 
37.3 KUMAR COMMENT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  3:06 PM 
2014] THE CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTY ACT 447 
the same   time,   the   infamous   auction   of   Rauschenberg’s   Thaw sparked a serious 
attempt to pass federal droit de suite legislation in the United States.32  Early in his 
career, famed artist Robert Rauschenberg sold a painting, entitled Thaw, to a 
collector, Robert Scull, for a humble $900.33  But when Scull resold the painting at 
a   Sotheby’s  Auction   for   $85,000,  Rauschenberg   became   furious.34  He famously 
complained,  “I’ve  been  working  my  ass  off  for  you  to  make  all  that  profit!”35 
This incident, combined with the contemporaneous scholarly work, led to the 
drafting of multiple bills with resale royalty provisions, both in state legislatures 
and in Congress.36  These efforts all proved fruitless, however, and the CRRA is 
still the only droit de suite law in the United States.37  Legislative interest has since 
waned as other states have waited to see if the California law will prove a useful 
model.  Although as many as fifteen other states have considered droit de suite 
 
royalty right for visual artists took place in France.  Starting in 1893, advocates of artists began calling 
for a resale right to be recognized by the French government.  In 1920, mounting public pressure led the 
French legislature to adopt a resale royalty right for artists.  Literally meaning “follow up right,” the 
droit de suite granted French visual artists a 3% royalty upon resale of their works.  See Hauser, supra 
note 4, at 1, 3–4.  Other countries soon followed the example set by the French.  By 1941, the 
governments of Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uruguay and Belgium had all enacted droit de suite 
legislation.  See Jeffrey C. Wu, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market:  A Follow-Up Study, 46 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 531, 535 (1999) (citing Schulder, supra note 1, at 22 n.13).  When the Berne 
Convention was revised in 1971, the revisers added a new provision encouraging member states to 
codify “the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the work subsequent to the first transfer by the 
author of the work.”  See Robert Plaisant, Droit de Suite and Droit Moral Under the Berne Convention, 
11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157, 157 (1987).  In 2001, the European Union adopted a Directive 
requiring all member states to enact droit de suite legislation that satisfies specific guidelines.  See 
Council Directive 2001/84, Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001 
O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC).  
 32. John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
241, 247 (1993). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  Since the well-publicized encounter, Rauschenberg has worked to implement droit de 
suite legislation, even sparking a film about the sale and his subsequent efforts.  Id.; see generally 
Baruch D. Kirschenbaum, The Scull Auction and the Scull Film, 39 ART J. 50 (1979). 
 36. See, e.g., H.B. 808, 112th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., §§ 3379.10–.23 (Ohio 1977); Elizabeth 
S. Weaver, Artists’ Resale Royalties Legislation:  Ohio House Bill 808 and a Proposed Alternative, 9 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 366, 367 (1978) (“On the federal level, forty-two bills providing artists’ rights in thirty-six 
areas in addition to resale royalties are currently pending in Congress.”); 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 6.  
Starting in the 1960s and continuing every decade since, there have been repeated efforts in Congress to 
implement some form of a resale royalty.  In 1978, Congressman Henry Waxman of California’s Thirty-
Third District (which includes much of Los Angeles County) introduced the Visual Artists Residual 
Rights Act, which would have guaranteed a 5% royalty to artists for works resold at over $1000.  See 
Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. (1978).  Representative Waxman’s 
bill would have created a new administrative body under the Department of the Treasury tasked with 
enforcing the right and collecting the royalty.  Id.  In 1987, Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative 
Edward Markey of Massachusetts jointly introduced legislation which would have granted visual artists 
certain moral rights as well as a 7% royalty on the difference between the purchase price and the resale 
price, above a minimum threshold.  See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th 
Cong. (1986); Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1618, 100th Cong. § 3 (1987).  The Kennedy-
Markey Bill would have conditioned eligibility on registration with the Copyright Office.  Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1987, S. 1618, 100th Cong. § 3 (1987).  
 37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2014). 
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legislation,38 the constitutional, administrative and economic barriers discussed in 
this Comment have likely served as deterrents to implementation.39 
This Comment demonstrates why some observers are correct to assert that droit 
de suite legislation can only be successful if implemented at the federal level.40  
The following sections discuss the challenges to the CRRA on appeal in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
Although the Copyright Office issued a report in 1992 advising Congress 
against droit de suite implementation,41 an updated report recommends the 
adoption of a federal resale royalty.42  This Comment concludes that the updated 
report provides the blueprint for a robust federal resale royalty that avoids the 
constitutional and administrative concerns of state-level implementation. 
A.  THE CRRA 
The California Resale Royalty Act was enacted in 1976.  The CRRA requires 
payment to American artists43 “[w]hen  a  work  of  fine  art  is  sold  at  auction  or  by  a  
gallery,   dealer,   broker,  museum”   and   “the   seller   resides   in  California   or   the   sale  
takes place in California.”44  Fine  art  is  defined  as  “an  original  painting,  sculpture,  
or   drawing   or   an   original   work   of   art   in   glass.”45  Unless the right is waived or 
assigned away in writing, the CRRA obligates either the seller or his agent to pay a 
5% royalty of the total sales price to the artist.46  Anytime an auction house, 
gallery,  dealer,  broker,  museum  or  other  person  acting  as  the  seller’s  agent  sells  a  
work  of  art,   that  entity  “shall  withhold  5  percent  of  the  amount  of  the  sale,   locate  
the  artist  and  pay  the  artist.”47  Upon the death of the artist, the right transfers to the 
artist’s   heirs   for   a   period   of   twenty   years.48  The CRRA also provides for a 
collection agency, the California Arts Council, to collect and hold royalties on 
behalf of the artist until he or she is located.49  Although the original act rendered 
the right effectively unwaivable, an amendment enacted in 1982 allowed artists to 
 
 38. Joint Opening Brief for Sotheby’s and Christie’s, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, No. 12-
56077 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012) [hereinafter “Auction Houses’ Brief”]. 
 39. In New York, for example, droit de suite legislation has been considered and rejected on over 
ten different occasions.  Id. at 6. 
 40. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8C.04[C][2] (2012) (“[A]ny such right, if enacted at all, 
must be on the federal level.”); Jay B. Johnson, Comment, Copyright:  Droit de Suite: An Artist Is 
Entitled to Royalties Even After He’s Sold His Soul to the Devil, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 493, 498 (1992) 
(arguing for the adoption of a federal resale royalty given “obvious disadvantages of leaving control of 
the resale royalty right to the individual states”).  
 41. See generally 1992 Report, supra note 15. 
 42. See generally 2013 Report, supra note 6. 
 43. The CRRA defines  “artist”  as  anyone  who, “at the time of resale, is a citizen of the United 
States, or a resident of the state who has resided in the state for a minimum of two years.”  CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 986(c)(1) (West 2014).  
 44. Id. § 986(a). 
 45. Id. § 986(c)(2). 
 46. Id. § 986(a). 
 47. Id. § 986(a)(1). 
 48. Id. § 986(a)(7). 
 49. Id. § 986(a)(2). 
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assign away the right to collect the royalty.50 
Throughout its history, the CRRA has experienced rampant under-
enforcement.51  In 1987, over a decade after implementation, the president of 
Sotheby’s   testified   that   the   CRRA   had   garnered   only   $15,000   in   royalties.52  In 
making its ruling, the district court noted that, to date, around 400 artists have 
secured as little as $328,000 total in royalties under the CRRA.53  The 
administrative body in charge of collecting and distributing the royalties lacks 
funding and enforcement rights,54 and the law has been criticized for placing too 
high a burden on the seller—or more likely the auction house, dealer, broker or 
museum  acting  as  the  seller’s  agent—to locate the artist and deliver the royalty.55  
Interestingly, California uses criminal law to promote transparency in the art 
market:    it  is  a  misdemeanor  in  California  to  make  “a  false  statement  as to the price 
obtained  for  any  property  consigned  or  entrusted  for  sale.”56  Even so, prosecution 
seems unlikely, and the law has little value as a tool for artists attempting to collect 
royalties.57  As   one   dealer   noted,   “nobody’s   paid,   nobody’s   sued,   [and] 
everybody’s  avoiding  it.”58 
 
 50. Id. § 986(a) (amended 1982); see also NIMMER, supra note 5, at § 8C.04 [B][6] 
(“Presumably, the intent is that the seller who is obligated to pay the royalty may not also be the 
assignee of the artist’s royalty right.”). 
 51. See William A. Carleton, III, Note, Copyright Royalties for Visual Artists:  A Display-Based 
Alternative to the Droit de Suite, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 532 (1991) (“The little evidence available 
indicates that the [California] Act is ineffective and practically unenforceable.”); Mara Grumbo, Note, 
Accepting Droit de Suite as an Equal and Fair Measure Under Intellectual Property Law and 
Contemplation of Its Implementation in the United States Post Passage of the EU Directive, 30 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 368 (2008) (“There appears to be a general consensus that the 
[California] Act is at best ineffective and at worst disastrous.”); see also Stephanie B. Turner, The 
Artist’s Resale Royalty Right:  Overcoming the Information Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329, 363 
(2012). 
 52. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987:  Hearing on S. 1619 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 304 (1987) 
(statement of Michael L. Ainslie, President and Chief Executive Officer, Sotheby’s Holdings, Inc.). 
 53. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2012), appeal 
docketed, No. 12-56077 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012) (“[E]nforcement of the CRRA has been spotty.  The 
New York Times recently reported that, since the CRRA was passed in 1977, approximately 400 artists 
have received a total of $328,000 in resale royalties.” (citing Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, 
Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/ design/artists-
file-suit-against-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html)); see also Jori Finkel, Lessons of California’s Droit 
de Suite Debacle, THEARTNEWSPAPER (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/ 
blogs/Lessons-of-Californias-droit-de-suite-debacle/31771. 
 54. See CLARE MCANDREW & LORNA DALLAS-CONTE, IMPLEMENTING DROIT DE SUITE 
(ARTISTS’ RESALE RIGHT) IN ENGLAND 44 (2002), available at http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/media/ 
uploads/documents/publications/325.pdf. 
 55. Toni Mione, Note, Resale Royalties for Visual Artists:  The United States Taking Cues From 
Europe, 21 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 461, 469 (2013). 
 56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 536 (West 2014). 
 57. A 1986 survey of artists conducted by the Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts found that 32% of 
respondents “said dealers had refused to give them the name or address of the buyer or even the resale 
price, despite their right under the [CRRA] to assign collection of the royalty to another.”  Estate of 
Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 n.3 (quoting Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite:  Why American 
Fine Artists Should Have a Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509, 523 (1995)). 
 58. See Carleton, supra note 51, at 532. 
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More critically, it had long been suspected—even by the drafters of the 
CRRA—that the law was an impermissible encroachment on the U.S. 
Constitution.59  An invalidation of the CRRA on the basis federal copyright 
preemption and the dormant commerce clause would likely prevent any other state 
from implementing an effective resale royalty.  Although it is possible that droit de 
suite legislation could be fashioned as a permissible state regulatory or tax law, any 
law that was so circumscribed would lack both scope and efficacy. 
When   a   consortium   of   artists   and   artists’   estates   sued   auctioneers   Sotheby’s,  
Christie’s   and   eBay   in  2011   for  disregarding   the  California   law,60 the defendants 
expressed confidence in their defenses based on federal copyright preemption and 
the dormant commerce clause.61  In May 2012, the District Court for the Central 
District   of   California   dismissed   the   artists’   lawsuit   on   the   grounds   that   the  
California Resale Royalties Act indeed violated the dormant commerce clause.62  
Although the artists have appealed to the Ninth Circuit with the support of multiple 
amicus briefs,63 the CRRA is likely to be struck down in whole, or at minimum 
crippled beyond repair.  While the questions of federal preemption and dormant 
commerce clause are both at issue, the dormant commerce clause argument 
presents the most compelling and potent challenge to the CRRA.  The Ninth Circuit 
will almost certainly find that the law impermissibly encroaches on the federal 
government’s  sole  right to regulate interstate commerce. 
B.  THE RESALE ROYALTY WILL LIKELY SURVIVE FEDERAL COPYRIGHT 
PREEMPTION 
While the Ninth Circuit previously held that the Copyright Act of 1909 did not 
preempt the CRRA,64 the panel hearing Estate  of  Graham  v.   Sotheby’s will have 
 
 59. See Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at 5–6 (discussing letters to California legislators 
stating concerns the CRRA “would constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce in contravention 
of the Federal Constitution in its application to sales which occur outside the State of California”). 
 60. See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987:  Hearing on S. 1619 Before the S. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 304 
(1987) (statement of Michael L. Ainslie, President and Chief Executive Officer, Sotheby’s Holdings, 
Inc.).  Testifying before a 1987 Senate subcommittee hearing, then-President and CEO of Sotheby’s 
Michael Ainslie admitted that Sotheby’s compliance with the California Resale Royalty Act had been 
“virtually nonexistent.”  In the first decade after the CRRA was passed, Sotheby’s set aside a mere 
$15,000 in royalties.  To provide context, Ainslie testified that Sotheby’s had most recently conducted 
$1.3 billion in annual sales.  Id. at 1. 
 61. Priscilla Frank, Artists Sue Auction Houses Over Royalties Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/artists-sue-auction-house_0_n_1023126.html (quo-
ting Sotheby’s:  “We believe that we have meaningful defenses to the claims asserted and they will be 
vigorously defended.”). 
 62. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2012), appeal 
docketed, No. 12-56077 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012). 
 63. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Artists Rights Society, Inc., Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 
860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, appeal docketed, No. 12-56067 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2013); Brief of Amici Curiae 
California Lawyers for the Arts et al., Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, appeal 
docketed, No. 12-56067 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2013). 
 64. See Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).  Because the transactions at issue 
took place prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to 
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the first opportunity to determine whether the Copyright Act of 1976 preempts a 
state law claim for payment of resale royalties.65  Although legislative history 
suggests  that  Congress  did  not  intend  for  the  Copyright  Act  of  1976  to  preempt  “a  
right to a  resale  royalty,”66 numerous commentators have suggested that the CRRA 
may nonetheless be preempted by either the first sale doctrine enunciated in § 109 
of the Copyright Act, or the exclusive distribution rights granted by § 106.67  In its 
1992 Report, the  Copyright  Office  “firmly  suggest[ed]  that  any  state  droit de suite 
provision  would  be  preempted  under  U.S.  Copyright  Law.”68 
Professor Nimmer explains the preemption provision of the Copyright Act of 
1976 as follows: 
[T]he Copyright Act pre-empts state law provided the following two elements 
coalesce:    (1)  the  rights  created  under  state  law  must  be  “equivalent”  to  one  or  more  of  
the rights contained in the Copyright Act; and (2) such rights under state law must be 
applicable  to  works  that  constitute  “works  of  authorship”  within  the  subject  matter  of  
the Copyright Act.69 
To  escape  federal  copyright  preemption,  a  “state  claim  must  have  an  extra  element  
which  changes  the  nature  of  the  action.”70  However, merely adding an element is 
insufficient  if  the  state  right  is  “part  and  parcel  of  the  copyright  claim.”71 
On appeal, the auction houses have argued that resale royalties for works of 
visual art are equivalent to the exclusive distribution rights granted in § 106.  In a 
separate, earlier decision also concerning the constitutionality of the CRRA, Judge 
Nguyen rejected this argument on a number of grounds.72  First, she found that 
legislative history belied the argument that resale royalties are equivalent to federal 
copyright’s  exclusive distribution rights.73  Judge Nguyen further reasoned that an 
artist may elect to give up his exclusive rights by transferring his copyright 
ownership, but will still retain the so-called extra right to a 5% resale royalty.74  
For example, in Durgom v. Janowiak,   a  California   court   held   that   the   “state   law  
right to receive royalties pursuant to a contract is not equivalent to any of the 
exclusive  rights  secured  by  a  federal  copyright.”75  The exclusive distribution rights 
granted  by  federal  copyright  “function  harmoniously  rather  than  discordantly”  with  
 
address § 301(a) preemption.  Id. at 975. 
 65. Cf. Baby Moose Drawings, Inc. v. Valentine, 2011 WL 1258529 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) 
(holding that the CRRA is not preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 66. Id. at *9–10. 
 67. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8C.04; 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 
1129 n.235 (1994); Mione, supra note 55, at 474–75. 
 68. 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 20 n.129 (citing the 1992 Report, supra note 15). 
 69. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8C.04[C]. 
 70. Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 71. Id. at 1144. 
 72. Baby Moose Drawings v. Valentine, 2011 WL 1258529 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (Nguyen, J.). 
 73. Id. at *3 (“State artists’ rights laws that grant rights not equivalent to those accorded under the 
proposed law are not preempted, even when they relate to works covered by [the Copyright Act]. For 
example, the law will not preempt a cause of action for . . . a violation of a right to a resale royalty.” 
(citing H.R. 514, 101st Cong. (1990)).   
 74. See id. 
 75. Durgom v. Janowiak, 74 Cal. App. 4th 178, 186–87 (1999). 
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the right to collect a resale royalty.76  A resale royalty adds an additional incentive 
to the one created by the exclusive distribution rights granted by federal copyright.  
“[W]here   Congress   determines   that neither federal protection nor freedom from 
restraint is required by national interest, the States remain free to promote 
originality  and  creativity  in  their  own  domains.”77 
The   auction   houses   have   also   argued   that   California’s   resale   royalty   conflicts 
with the objectives of the first sale doctrine, which precludes a copyright owner 
from controlling the resale of his work once he has initially transferred title.78  A 
resale royalty functions by affecting downstream sales of works of visual art, which 
are certainly within the subject matter of copyright.  Yet, this argument is also 
unlikely to succeed.  The Ninth Circuit previously held in Morseburg v. Balyon that 
the CRRA was not preempted by the first sale doctrine as enunciated in the 
Copyright Act of 1909.79  Critically, the Ninth Circuit has also held that the first 
sale  doctrine   in   the  1909  and  1976  copyrights  acts  are  “substantively   identical,”80 
suggesting that if the 1909 Act did not preempt the CRRA, neither will the 1976 
Act. 
More fundamentally, while the first sale doctrine prevents a seller from exerting 
downstream pressure through his capacity as a copyright owner, the CRRA permits 
such  downstream  pressure  through  a  seller’s  capacity  as  the  artist.  Droit de suite 
legislation occupies a vacuum created by federal copyright—the resale royalty is a 
recognition   that   “[c]opyright   law   has   discriminated   . . . against artists for 
centuries.”81  The very reason that visual artists require a resale royalty is because 
the first sale doctrine fails to account for their unique needs.82  State laws such as 
the CRRA grant certain rights that are independent of copyright ownership, and 
thus do not upset the balance of incentives created by federal law.83  And while 
copyright law prevents a copyright holder from influencing downstream sales, it 
does not prohibit some other source of state law—such as contract law, or as here, 
the CRRA—from regulating goods and products after their initial sale. 
C.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE PROHIBITS CALIFORNIA FROM 
REGULATING EXTRATERRITORIAL ART SALES 
While federal law should not preempt the CRRA, the Ninth Circuit is 
 
 76. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 77. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989). 
 78. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013). 
 79. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977. 
 80. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1182 n.7. 
 81. Katreina Eden, Comment, Fine Artists’ Resale Royalty Right Should Be Enacted in the United 
States, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 121, 140 (2005). 
 82. Cary T. Platkin, In Search of a Compromise to the Music Industry’s Used CD Dilemma, 29 
U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 522 (1995) (noting “the injustice built into the federal Copyright Act as a result of 
the first sale doctrine”). 
 83. Cf. Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 
IOWA L. REV. 959, 1002 (1991) (concluding that “as the ‘Fine Art’ protected by the California Statute is 
subject to the rights and remedies of the Copyright Act, only Congress has the power to evaluate the 
data and establish a Droit de Suite”). 
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nonetheless likely   to  uphold   the  district  court’s   ruling   that   the  CRRA  violates   the  
dormant commerce clause.  The drafters of the CRRA themselves originally 
expressed doubts regarding whether the law satisfied the dormant commerce 
clause, and this critical piece of legislative history will bear on the severability of 
the impermissible portion of the CRRA.  But even a partially successful challenge 
based on the dormant commerce clause would likely devastate any hope for the 
CRRA or any other state-level implementation. 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress exclusive authority to regulate interstate 
commerce, and by negative implication, prohibits regulation of interstate commerce 
by the states.84  After some early uncertainty, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Commerce Clause to allow states to regulate commerce of a local character, even if 
it had interstate effects.85  Even then, the Supreme Court has historically struck 
down   state   laws   that   “favor   in-state economic interests over out-of-state 
interests.”86  “[A]  statute  that  directly  controls  commerce  occurring  wholly  outside  
the   boundaries   of   a   State   exceeds   the   inherent   limits   of   the   enacting   State’s  
authority and is invalid  regardless  of  whether  the  statute’s  extraterritorial  reach  was  
intended  by  the  legislature.”87 
The auction houses argued that the CRRA marked an attempt by California to 
impermissibly regulate sales occurring outside its borders.88  Sitting by designation 
on  the  district  court,  Judge  Nguyen  agreed  and  explained  that  “the  CRRA  explicitly  
regulates  applicable  sales  of  fine  art  occurring  wholly  outside  California,”  and  that  
“the  [law]  regulates   transactions  occurring  anywhere  in  the  United  States,  so  long  
as the  seller  resides  in  California.”89  As such, the district court held that the CRRA 
impermissibly aims to regulate an area that is exclusively reserved for Congress.90 
The   district   court’s   decision   to   strike   down   the   CRRA   on   the   basis   of   the  
dormant commerce clause was perhaps long overdue.  In 1976, Stanford Professor 
John Merryman sent a letter to California legislators warning them not to extend 
the effect of the CRRA outside of California.91  A few months later, Legislative 
Counsel George Murphy advised both the legislators and the governor in a detailed 
memorandum  that   the  extraterritorial   reach  of   the  bill  “would  constitute  an  undue  
burden on interstate commerce in contravention of the Federal Constitution in its 
application  to  sales  which  occur  outside  the  State  of  California.”92  The decision to 
preserve the extraterritorial reach of the law persuaded the district court that the 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the dormant commerce clause). 
 85. Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (in the wake of steamboat navigation, 
struggling with whether Congress and state legislatures had concurrent power to regulate interstate 
commerce), with Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851) (holding that subjects that are national 
in nature or that require a uniform system or plan of regulation are exclusively for Congress to regulate). 
 86. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); see 
also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).  
 87. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 88. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1120 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2012). 
 89. Id. at 1123–24. 
 90. Id. at 1124. 
 91. See Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at *5–6. 
 92. Id. at 6. 
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legislature  had  made  “an  obvious  attempt to prevent the art market from fleeing the 
state  to  avoid  the  royalty.”93  That the CRRA has survived for nearly four decades, 
notwithstanding this early recognition of its constitutional defects, is perhaps only a 
testament to  the  law’s  negligible  effect on the California art market. 
The artists argue on appeal that the CRRA burdens only California residents, 
and not interstate commerce.94  The Supreme Court has been clear that the dormant 
commerce clause serves not only to invalidate protectionist state legislation, but 
also to prevent states from directly regulating interstate commerce.95  The fact that 
the law is not protectionist does not preclude the Ninth Circuit from finding that the 
CRRA directly regulates extraterritorial transactions and the nonresident agents of 
sellers—typically an auction house, broker, dealer, museum or some other person 
that facilitates the sale.  The CRRA is not directed at local concerns, with only 
incidental effects on interstate commerce;96 rather, it explicitly and directly 
regulates transactions and actors outside of California. 
Consider   the  example  given  by  Judge  Nguyen:      “Assume  a  California   resident  
places  a  painting  by  a  New  York  artist  up   for  auction  at  Sotheby’s   in  New  York,  
and at the auction a New York resident purchases   the  painting  for  $1,000,000.”97  
As Judge Nguyen noted, the California resident is not the only party burdened by 
the   CRRA;;   the   CRRA   also   places   affirmative   responsibilities   on   Sotheby’s,   a  
resident of New York:98 
[The CRRA] regulates the transaction by   mandating   that   Sotheby’s   (1)   withhold  
$50,000 (i.e., 5% of the auction sale price); (2) locate the artist; and (3) remit the 
$50,000  to  the  New  York  artist.     Should  Sotheby’s  in  New  York  fail  to  comply,  the  
New York artist may bring a legal action under [the CRRA] to recover the applicable 
royalty.99 
Because the CRRA not only regulates transactions occurring outside its borders, 
but also regulates sellers’ agents (California residents or not), it is clearly not true 
that the law only regulates commerce of a local nature.  No state may regulate the 
extraterritorial conduct of a nonresident in this fashion.100 
 
 93. Mione, supra note 55, at 472 (citing Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1126). 
 94. See generally Opposition of Motion to Dismiss, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, No. 12-56077 
(9th Cir. June 8, 2012). 
 95. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986) (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its 
effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down 
the statute without further inquiry.”). 
 96. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that 
constitutionality of local law turns on whether the law is “directed to legitimate local concerns, with 
effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental”). 
 97. Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 573–74 (invalidating a New York 
statute that regulated extraterritorial transactions involving interstate wholesale liquor distillers). 
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D.  THE CRRA CANNOT BE UPHELD AS A TAX LAW 
On appeal, the artists have portrayed the resale royalty as a state tax to fashion a 
constitutional argument not raised in the district court.101  The   Supreme   Court’s  
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence allows state governments to impose 
nondiscriminatory and fairly apportioned taxes on activities that physically take 
place outside of the state.102  Rather than treating the royalty as a commercial 
regulation, the artists have instead characterized it as a use tax, or alternatively, as a 
tax on the gross receipts of the California seller.  While the characterization of the 
resale royalty as a tax is itself suspect, even if accepted as such, the law would still 
violate the dormant commerce clause. 
1.  The CRRA Is Not a Tax Law 
The artists’   argue that the CRRA places a burden, or tax, on the seller or the 
seller’s  agent  to  collect  the  royalty  and  deliver  it  to  the  artist.  The auction houses 
have responded that a resale royalty is fundamentally not a tax, because the 
“essential   feature   of   any   tax”   is   that   “it   produces   some   revenue   for   the  
Government.”103  The CRRA is clear that the royalty is paid directly from the 
“seller or   the   seller’s   agent   . . . to the artist of such work of fine art or to such 
artist’s   agent.”104  According to the Supreme Court “[a] tax, in the general 
understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for 
the support of the government [and] has never been thought to connote the 
expropriation  of  money  from  one  group  for  the  benefit  of  another.”105 
In addition, the legislative history of the CRRA expressly contradicts treatment 
of the royalty as a tax.  The CRRA had originally provided for the State Board of 
Equalization,  California’s  collector  of  sales  and  use  taxes,  to  administer  the  resale  
royalty.     The  government   agency  objected   that   its   “tax   collecting   authority   [was]  
not  applicable”  to  the  CRRA  because  “it  is  inappropriate to mix the enforcement of 
private  rights  with  the  administration  of  the  tax  laws.”106  The artists argue that the 
difference between a private right and a tax is merely semantic, and would seem to 
admit that the CRRA grants artists a cause of action against sellers and their agents 
for  “tax”  evasion.107 
The Ninth Circuit could easily rule that the dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence applicable to state taxes does not apply here because the California 
resale royalty is simply not a tax, but rather an impermissible commercial 
regulation  of  interstate  commerce.     The  court  may  nonetheless  address  the  artists’  
 
 101. See Appellee’s Motion to Strike, Estate of Graham, No. 12-56077 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2014). 
 102. See generally Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 103. Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at 33 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012)). 
 104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 2014). 
 105. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936). 
 106. Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at 34. 
 107. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, No. 12-56077 (9th Cir. Feb. 
28, 2013). 
37.3 KUMAR COMMENT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  3:06 PM 
456 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [37:3 
substantive arguments, because even if treated a tax, the royalty could still violate 
the dormant commerce clause.  It would not be impossible for another state to 
implement a resale royalty that actually functions as a tax, with the state collecting 
levies on art sales and using the revenue to directly or indirectly compensate artists.  
A  Ninth   Circuit   ruling   addressing   the  merits   of   the   artists’   tax   arguments   would  
indicate to other states whether a resale royalty can be implemented under the 
states’  authority  to  collect  revenue. 
2.  The CRRA Is Not a Constitutional Use Tax 
In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that 
states were permitted to tax activity occurring beyond their physical borders, as 
long as the tax satisfied certain conditions.108  As the California Supreme Court 
explained in a different case: 
[A use tax is] intended to reach property purchased for use and storage in the taxing 
jurisdiction from retailers who, being outside such jurisdiction, are not subject to its 
laws.  It also seeks to reach such property where the taxable event of a sales tax, i.e., 
the sale, occurs outside of this state or where such property is immune from the sales 
tax because of the commerce clause.109 
In order to tax such extraterritorial activity, four conditions must be met:  (1) the 
tax must be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) 
the tax must be fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate against 
interstate commerce and (4) the tax must fairly relate to the services provided by 
the state.110 
The artists supporting the CRRA have argued that California can reach beyond 
its borders to impose a use tax in the form of a resale royalty on art sold by 
California residents.  But as the auction houses have argued, the 5% royalty fails to 
satisfy three of the four requirements of the Complete Auto test.111 
First, the CRRA does not satisfy the requirement that the taxed activity have a 
substantial nexus with California.  There is no requirement in the CRRA that the 
work of art for sale ever have been located in California, or that the sale of the art 
be in any way connected to California outside of its seller’s  residency.    Indeed,  the  
royalty must be collected even when the only nexus   to   California   is   the   seller’s  
residency.112  But  “in  the  case  of  a  tax on an activity there must be a connection to 
 
 108. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).  
 109. Rivera v. Fresno, 490 P.2d  793, 796 (Cal. 1971). 
 110. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. 
 111. Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at 34. 
 112. Section 17014(a) of the California Revenue and Taxation Code defines a “resident” as either 
“every individual domiciled in this state who is outside the state for a temporary or transitory purpose” 
or “every individual who is in this state for other than a temporary or transitory purpose.”  See Noble v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 118 Cal. App. 4th 560, 566 (2004) (holding that California residents were subject to 
tax on sale of securities notwithstanding their intention to move to Colorado).  There is a statutory 
presumption that a person who spends nine months or more in California is a California resident, but this 
presumption is rebuttable.  See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17016 (West 2014). 
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the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the actor the States seeks to 
tax.”113  The auction houses point out that allowing the substantial nexus to be 
satisfied  solely  by  the  seller’s  residency  would lead to absurd results—for example, 
“a  Californian  who  opens   a  New  York   restaurant  may  be   taxed  by  California  on  
meals  sold  there.”114  When California’s  only  connection  is  to  the  “actor  it  seeks  to  
tax,”   and   not   the   “activity   itself,”   the   extraterritorial reach of a statute must be 
struck down. 
The artists point out that each of the defendants have physical presences in 
California and rely on Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, a case about upholding a use 
tax on nonresident mail-order retailers, for the proposition that an out-of-state 
merchant satisfies the substantial nexus merely by having a physical presence in the 
state.115  However, Justice Stevens made clear in Quill that physical presence is 
only   a   necessary   condition   of   the   “fair   relation”   requirement,   not a sufficient 
condition.116  More importantly, the physical presence must be related to the taxed 
activity.117  The Supreme Court has never held that the fair relation requirement can 
be satisfied by a physical presence that is completely unrelated to the taxed activity.  
Such a rule would allow states to impose a use tax on activities conducted outside 
its borders, merely because the party conducting the activity had an unrelated 
physical presence within the state. 
The question of whether the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the 
state  is  “closely  connected  to  the  first  prong  of  the  Complete Auto test.”118  Again, 
the CRRA does not require that the California seller ever stored or displayed the 
work  of   art   in  California,   or   that   the   seller’s   art   collection  has   any   connection   to  
California.  For example, imagine a California resident who purchases a work of art 
in   New   York   while   on   vacation,   and   then   displays   it   at   her   brother’s   home   in  
Brooklyn.      Five   years   later,   the  work   of   art   is   sold   at   a   Sotheby’s   auction.     Any  
services provided by California were in no way connected to the 5% resale royalty 
that the CRRA  requires  the  seller  or  Sotheby’s  to  withhold  from  the  purchase  price.    
Once   again,   the   statute’s   application   is   solely   dependent   on   the   actor, not the 
activity as required by the Supreme Court in Complete Auto.  Although the 
threshold for this requirement is admittedly low,119 the statute simply requires no 
connection between the extraterritorial art sales and services provided by the state 
of   California.      That   Sotheby’s   has   a   presence   in   California   is   irrelevant:      “any  
 
 113. Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992) (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 
504 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 114. Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at 46. 
 115. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 25, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2013) (No. 
12-56077) (citing Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313). 
 116. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313. 
 117. Id. at 302. 
 118. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625–26 (1981). 
 119. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 624 (holding that a use tax could be imposed on 
“activity connected to interstate commerce to contribute to the general cost of providing governmental 
services, as distinct from those costs attributable to the taxed activity, [such as] the cost of providing 
police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and the advantages of a civilized society” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
37.3 KUMAR COMMENT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  3:06 PM 
458 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [37:3 
benefit the Auction House[] receive[s] from California is unrelated to the out-of-
state  collection  of  royalties  for  artists.”120 
The most critical restraint in the Complete Auto test is the requirement that a use 
tax be fairly apportioned, evaluated by internal and external consistency tests.121  
The CRRA is neither internally consistent—the   requirement   that   “if   every   State  
were  to  impose  an  identical  tax,  no  multiple  taxation  would  result”—nor externally 
consistent—the requirement that only that portion of the revenues from the 
interstate activity which reasonably reflect the in-state component of the activity is 
being taxed.122 
If  either   “the   seller   resides   in  California  or   the   sale   takes  place   in  California,”  
the  CRRA  states  that  sellers  or  their  agents  “shall  pay  . . . 5 percent of the amount 
of [a]  sale,”  regardless  of  whether  other  states  are  also  collecting  resale  royalties.123  
Unlike   California’s   state   income   tax,   which   expressly   avoids   double   taxation   by  
allowing credits for income taxes paid to other states, the CRRA is not apportioned 
to tax only activity that is connected to California.124  Thus,  “if  every  State  were  to  
impose  an  identical  tax,”  double  taxation  would  occur  when  both  the  seller’s  state  
of residence and the state in which the sale takes place require a 5% royalty, 
resulting in a total exaction of 10% of the total sales price.125  The CRRA thus fails 
an internal consistency test. 
The CRRA is not externally consistent because the 5% royalty in no way 
reflects any in-state component of the activity.  As pointed out above in the 
substantial nexus discussion, the statute does not require any in-state element 
before taxing extraterritorial art sales.  Both tests make clear that even if the CRRA 
is considered a use tax, the burden imposed is unapportioned and unconstitutional. 
3.  The CRRA Is Not a Constitutional Tax on Gross Income 
The  artists  have  alternatively  argued  that  a  resale  royalty  is  a  tax  on  the  seller’s  
gross profitable receipts.  However, this characterization is misleading and relies on 
a tortured reading of the statute.  The CRRA treats the royalty as an exaction on the 
total   sales  price,  and  makes  no  mention  of   the   sellers’  gross   receipts.     Moreover,  
while the CRRA only applies to transactions where the sales price exceeds the 
seller’s   original   purchase   price,   there   is   no   requirement that the seller still be 
profitable after paying expenses associated with the resale, including sales 
commissions, legal fees, shipping, insurance and marketing. 
This distinction is critical, because if the resale royalty is a tax on gross receipts 
instead of on net profits, it does not meet the apportionment test articulated in 
 
 120. Auction Houses’ Brief, supra note 38, at 51.  
 121. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). 
 122. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989) (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169).  
 123. Id. 
 124. Noble v. Franchise Tax Bd., 118 Cal. App. 4th 560, 566 (2004) (citing CAL. REV. & TAX 
CODE § 18001 (West 2014)). 
 125. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 261 (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169); see Auction Houses’ 
Brief, supra note 38, at 48–49 (discussing double taxation under hypothetical “NYRRA”). 
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Complete Auto.126  In  “considering  the  constitutionality  of  a  gross  receipts  tax  . . . 
only the receipts generated from the in-state  component  of  the  underlying  activity”  
are taxable by the state.127  As discussed at length above, the CRRA is not 
“apportioned   to   reflect   the   location  of   the  various   interstate  activities  by  which   it  
was  earned”  and  therefore  violates  the  dormant  commerce  clause.128  No portion of 
the  seller’s  gross receipts from an extraterritorial sale is attributable to any in-state 
component, much less a 5% royalty on the total sales price. 
E.  SEVERANCE WON’T SAVE CALIFORNIA’S RESALE ROYALTY 
The future looks grim for the California Resale Royalty Act.  The Ninth Circuit 
is not likely to allow the CRRA, either as a regulation on local commerce or as a 
fairly apportioned tax.  Constitutional rulings of this nature would indicate to other 
states that any droit de suite legislation could only apply to in-state sales.  Of 
course,  such  a  law  would  likely  destroy  the  state’s  art  market.    Such  reasoning  was  
at   the  heart  of   the  district  court’s  decision   to  strike  down   the  entire  CRRA  rather  
than preserve the in-state effect of the law.129 
The Ninth Circuit is likely to closely  scrutinize  the  district  court’s  decision  that  
the out-of-state sales provision is not severable.  While the provision imposing a 
royalty on in-state sales surely passes constitutional muster, the district court found 
that the legislature viewed the out-of-state sales provision as indispensable and 
would not have passed the act without it.130  Judge Nguyen reasoned that without 
the out-of-state provisions, the California art market would suffer, an effect the 
CRRA’s   drafters   surely   hoped   to   avoid.131  Applying the volitional severability 
doctrine,132 Judge Nguyen ruled that that the severance provision did not apply, 
despite   its   explicit   instruction   that   “if   any   provision . . . is held invalid for any 
reason . . . such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions . . . and to this end 
the  provisions  of  this  section  are  severable.”133 
On appeal, the artists have used this same legislative history to argue in favor of 
severance.  They argue the severance provision was included to address the precise 
 
 126. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995).  
 127. Auction Houses’ Brief at 51 (citing Northwood Constr. Co. v. Township of Upper Moreland, 
579 Pa. 463 (2004)). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2012). 
 130. Id. at 1126. 
 131. Id. 
 132. “Severability is of course a matter of state law.”  Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996).  
Under California law, an invalid portion of a statute “can be severed if, and only if, it is grammatically, 
functionally and volitionally separable.”  Hotel Emps. & Restaurant Emps. Int’l Union v. Davis, 981 
P.2d 990, 1009 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1256 (Cal. 1989)).  
“[I]t is ‘volitionally separable if it was not of critical importance to the measure’s enactment.”  Id.  
Severance is not appropriate if “[the court] cannot be certain that the Legislature would have enacted the 
measure without the [offending] requirement.”  Cnty. of Sonoma v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 4th 
322, 352 (2009). 
 133. Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(e) (West 2014)). 
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concerns raised by Merryman and Murphy.134  Given the uncertain fate of the 
California sellers provision, the artists argue that the legislature included the 
severance provision to preserve the in-state reach of the statute even if the out-of-
state reach was struck down.  They argue that the legislative history does not 
establish conclusively that the out-of-state sales provision was considered 
indispensible.135  They further point out that, without citing any evidence, the 
district court assumed that the drafters were concerned about a potential negative 
market effect.136  In truth, the drafters may have recognized that hampering the 
California art market may have been a necessary evil in bestowing the benefits of 
the droit de suite on California artists. 
The artists likely have the better argument here, and only the extraterritorial 
reach of the law should be struck if it is judged unconstitutional.  The problem, 
however, is that if the CRRA is unable to reach California sellers, the law will 
almost certainly damage the California art market.  The CRRA would discourage 
sellers from conducting transactions inside California, at least as long as the cost of 
moving does not exceed 5% of the total sales price.  The larger the sale, the greater 
the incentive to conduct the transaction  outside  of  California’s  borders.    While  it  is  
unclear if the CRRA as it currently stands has harmed the California art market,137 
the CRRA would doubtlessly drive art sales out of the state if stripped of its 
extraterritorial reach. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  THE EQUITY FOR VISUAL ARTISTS 
ACT AND THE COPYRIGHT  OFFICE’S  2013  UPDATED REPORT ON 
THE RESALE ROYALTY 
Even as the CRRA faces elimination, artists may yet benefit from the birth of a 
federal resale royalty right.  In December 2011, Representative Jerrold Nadler of 
New York and Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin jointly introduced droit de suite 
legislation in Congress.138  The  Equity   for  Visual  Artists  Act  of  2011  seeks   “[t]o  
amend the copyright law to secure the rights of artists of works of visual art to 
provide   for   royalties.”139  Although the bill died in committee,140 it should find 
renewed   strength   and   support   in   the  Copyright  Office’s  most   recent   study   of   the  
resale royalty.  In the report, Register Maria Pallante reversed the Copyright 
Office’s prior position and recommended that Congress consider a resale royalty to 
place visual artists on equal footing with other artists.141 
 
 134. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 107, at 47–57.  
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 22 n.149. 
 138. Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000, 112th Cong. (2011); Equity for Visual Artists 
Act of 2011, H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 139. Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 140. Tracy Zwick, Battle Heats Up Over Resale Royalties for Artists, ART IN AMERICA MAGAZINE 
(May 7, 2013), http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/battle-heats-up-over-resale-
royalties-for-artists. 
 141. 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 1. 
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The Copyright Office made the following observations and recommendations in 
its report: 
•    Although visual artists possess the same exclusive rights under copyright law as 
other authors, they are disadvantaged as a practical matter by certain factors endemic 
to the creation of works that are produced in singular form (or in very limited copies) 
and are valued for their scarcity.  There are sound policy reasons to address this 
inequity, including the constitutionally-rooted objective to incentivize the creation and 
dissemination of artistic works. 
•    While a resale royalty could be one of many factors affecting the location of 
auctions and other art sales, there is no evidence to conclusively establish that it 
would harm the U.S. visual art market.  Studies produced since this Office last 
examined the issue in 1992 belie earlier assumptions that a resale royalty would 
substantially reduce prices in the primary art market or shift the secondary art market 
away from the United States. 
•    Although adoption of a resale royalty right is one option to address the disparate 
treatment of artists under the law, it is not the only option, and more deliberation is 
necessary  to  determine  if  it   is  the  best  option.    The  Office’s  1992  report  highlighted  
the fact that resale royalties appear to benefit only an extremely small number of 
artists.  Current studies and reports remain consistent with this view.  In light of the 
potentially limited benefits, the costs of the law (e.g., administration and 
enforcement), while not insurmountable, suggest that Congress should approach this 
issue with some caution. 
•   Should Congress wish to adopt a resale royalty right in the United States, the Office 
recommends that the legislation: [a]pply to sales of works of visual art by auction 
houses, galleries, private dealers, and other persons and entities engaged in the 
business of selling visual art; [i]nclude a relatively low threshold value to ensure that 
the royalty benefits as many artists as possible; [e]stablish a royalty rate of 3 percent 
to 5 percent of  the  work’s  gross  resale  price  (i.e., a range generally in line with royalty 
rates in several other countries) for those works that have increased in value; [i]nclude 
a cap on the royalty payment available from each sale; [a]pply prospectively to the 
resale of works acquired after the law takes effect; [p]rovide for collective 
management by private collecting societies, with general oversight by the U.S. 
Copyright Office; [r]equire copyright registration as a prerequisite to receiving 
royalties; [l]imit remedies to a specified monetary payment rather than actual or 
statutory damages; [a]t least initially, apply only for a term of the life of the artist; and 
[r]equire a Copyright Office study of the effect of the royalty on artists and the art 
market within a reasonable time after enactment.142 
The relatively successful foreign implementation of resale royalty rights over the 
last two decades has clearly encouraged the Copyright Office to reconsider its 
previous position that the primary or secondary art market would be harmed by a 
resale royalty.  Indeed, the report reviewed droit de suite legislation in 79 
jurisdictions, with special attention to the effect of the royalty in the United 
Kingdom and the European Union.143 
 
 142. Id. at 3–4. 
 143. Id. at 48–51.  The Copyright Office noted that “there is certainly no conclusive proof that the 
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The report also noted  that  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  may  consider  droit de 
suite legislation, which would alleviate fears that a federal resale royalty would 
shift art transactions out of the United States.144  As the California legislature was 
all too aware, the portability of the art market poses a serious threat to 
implementation of a resale royalty.  A coherent latticework of federal and foreign 
legislation would make it much more difficult for sellers to move to a resale 
royalty-free jurisdiction. 
The Copyright Office Report also provides practical suggestions for crafting a 
resale  royalty  that  will  be  far  more  effective  than  California’s   royalty.  The report 
calls for mandatory registration requirements, oversight by the Copyright Office 
and administrative fees paid to private collection societies—all   to   help   “mitigate  
the administrative and transactional costs associated with a resale royalty scheme,”  
particularly one that applies to both public and private sales.145 
CONCLUSION 
The CRRA suffers from constitutional and administrative infirmities that would 
plague any state-level implementation of droit de suite legislation.  The California 
law impermissibly restricts interstate commerce and cannot be saved by 
characterizing the resale royalty as a tax.  A dormant commerce clause ruling 
would likely prevent any other state from crafting a resale royalty that would not 
destroy  that  state’s  local  art  market. 
Federal resale royalty legislation can reach where California cannot.  A federal 
resale royalty would not only avoid problematic constitutional issues and reduce 
concerns about sellers fleeing, but could also offer a far more successful 
enforcement scheme by  relying  on  the  Copyright  Office’s  experience  keeping track 
of creative works through the registration system.  The Ninth Circuit may soon 
decide the fate of the California Resale Royalty Act, but Congress will have the last 
word on whether all American artists can benefit from the droit de suite. 
 
 
U.K or EU markets have suffered (or, for that matter, benefitted), directly or indirectly from the resale 
royalty.”  Id. at 50.  
 144. Id. at 19–20.  The Chinese secondary market has recently exploded, putting China on par with 
the United States with respect to market share.  The People’s Republic of China is currently revising its 
copyright laws, and recent media outlets have reported that the latest draft includes a resale royalty 
provision.  See, e.g., id. at 19 (citing Katie Hunt, China Debates Droit de Suite, THE ART NEWSPAPER 
(Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/China-debates-droit-de-suite/28565; Will 
Droit de Suite Be Established in China?, ART MEDIA AGENCY (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.artmedia 
agency.com/ en/61427/will-droit-de-suite-be-established-in-china). 
 145. Id. at 80. 
